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Father Knows Best
Abstract
In his essay, "Althusser's Mirror," Carsten Strathausen reveals the paternal politics inherent to any gesture
of appropriation. Molding Lacan to an Althusserian mirror, Strathausen demonstrates parallels between
Lacan's mirror stage and Althusser's interpellated subject. The resemblance, created through what
Strathausen suggests is Althusser's mis-reading of Lacan, reveals their mutual influence. The question of
influence, however, becomes an issue of tradition Althusser links to a politics of legitimacy and right he
associates with a figure of paternity. While the process of filiation would seem to extend from Lacan to
Althusser in the logic of the mirror employed by Strathausen to renew Marxist thought, Althusser also
situates himself as the father to a Lacan he is attempting to salvage from the ignominy of illegitimacy.
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Father Knows Best
Judith Roof
University ofDelaware

"Marx based his theory on a rejection of homo oeconomicus,"
wrote Louis Althusser, "Freud based his on a rejection of homo
psychologicus." Lacan has seen and understood Freud's liberating
rupture. He has comprehended it in the full sense of the word, taking it
in its full rigor and constraining it to generate-without reservationits own consequences. Like anyone, he may err in details, or even in his
choice of philosophical bearings. What we owe him is the "essential"
("Freud and Lacan" 181). The "essential" is the understanding of
rupture that places Freud in a triumvirate with Marx and Nietzsche, the
other two "Natural" children of the end of the nineteenth century.
Sharing a philosophical fatherlessness, these bastards represent not only
a break in philosophical tradition, but also a break in the very idea of
tradition, legacy, and the continuation of the name of the father.
Beginning his 1964 essay "Freud and Lacan" with an extended
metaphor of paternity, Althusser casts the "history ofWestern Reason"
as a family affair:
When a young science is born, the family circle is always ready for
astonishment, jubilation, and baptism. Fora long time, every child,
even the foundling, has been the reputed son of a father, and when
it is a prodigy, the fathers would fight at the gate if it were not for
the mother and the respect due her. (181)

That Althusser should celebrate the eruption of genius, defined as the
founders ofthe critical ruptures by which the science ofmodern criticism
is born, in the terms of a conservative patriarchal tradition is not too
suspect, except insofar as one might wish to critique the identification
between philosophy and patriarchy. Althusser's five paragraphs about
the absence of paternity and legitimacy, however, point, in an overcompensatory manner, to the nature of the legitimizing gesture Althusser
is about to make in regard to Lacan, one he began to make in 1963. But
the problem of father and son neither begins nor ends with Althusser in
this family circle. Rather, we owe it to Carsten Strathausenfor revealing
the paternal politics inherent to any gesture of appropriation.
Althusser's notion of the interpellated subject owes much to his
misreading of Lacan, argues Strathausen in his essay, "Althusser's
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Mirror." Outlining the parallels between Althusser's notion of the
interpellated subject and Lacan' s analogy of the mirror stage, Strathausen
demonstrates both Althusser's debt to Lacan and "the positive potential
of any appropriation of Lacanian psychoanalysis for the understanding
of ideology" (61). Using his own analogy of the mirror, Strathausen
argues that Althusser's concept of interpellation "rests on the idea of the
`mirror-stage' as the founding moment of the imaginary" (66). The
temporal paradox inherent in Lacan's mirror stage-the idea that only
after an infant gains a certain (anticipated) mastery can it understand the
chaos from which it came-situates the mirror stage as the moment
from which origins can be perceived as origins and can be enjoyed no
longer. As a response to the question ofwhen an individual is interpellated
as a subject in ideology the mirror stage is clearly inadequate, but its
model of interpellation, resting as it does on a gestalt, suggests a
beginning point for the intersection of the nascent subject and the
outside world.
The mirror stage is the figuration of a process by which the subject
comes to be constituted in history and ideology, but the mirror stage is
not quite emblematic of the kind of mirroring logic Strathausen
proposes between Althusser and Lacan. In a temporal ellipse and
material eclipse, Strathausen tries to load Althusser's interpellated
subject into the mirror stage as a figure by which subjectivity, is
completely constituted. And to maintain his mirror, more parallelism
than might actually exist is necessary. Paradoxically, Strathausen's
forced parallel between the mirror stage and the interpellated subject
forecloses the intricate dynamics of Lacan's quadrated subject, the very
dynamics that might in fact provide some understanding of the relation
between psychoanalytic and material conceptions of the subject. The
mirror stage is only a point of departure (and not even really a point) to
which the developing subject comes and from which the split subject
continues to develop in its relation to the Other, to the others of culture,
ideology, law, and to itself, existing simultaneously in the Imaginary,
the Symbolic and the Real. This is very different, even in its vastly
paraphrased form, from Althusser's claim of only a portion of Lacan,
and curiously, in Strathausen's analysis, only the extra-linguistic
portion.
The most glaring disparity between Althusser and Lacan in
Strathausen's presentation is evident in Strathausen's attempt to parallel their accounts of the subject, which he consistently envisions within
the frame of an historical dialectic. Rereading Lacan's notions of the
"Je" (Es) and Moi (ego) as stages in a process of splitting, Strathausen
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/8
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notion of the unconscious. Though as Strathausen warns, "it is
crucial to distinguish between the 'I' (Je) and the 'ego' (moi)," he
conceives of the former as "the split subject of the signifier" and the
latter as "the imaginary self-identity of the subject" (68). In Lacan's
subject, the Je and Moi exist as parts of a dynamic that exists in relation
to the Other and to the others of culture, ideology, and law. The "le"
is the speaking subject, split indeed, but rarely aware of it, split in fact
by the co-presence of the "Moi," "the unconscious subject of identifications and narcissism" (Ragland-Sullivan 42). Apart from omitting
entirely the Other (other) parts of the quadrature, Strathausen's account
also implies an order, first Je then Moi, which makes too literal Freud's
statement "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" and which situates half of a
split subject as a temporal structure rather than a structural dynamic.
Strathausen parses the subject in this way in order to make a
comparison between Lacan's split subject and Althusser's idea of
interpellation as a "hailing," a turning around. If the subject is always
"turning around" within itself, as a function of its own first-Je-thenMoi splitting, then the psychoanalytic subject is already analogous to the
interpellated subject: "inside" mirrors "outside," psychoanalysis and
ideological critique cooperate, being like to like. While contriving
parallels entails considerable stretching, here on the part of Strathausen,
Strathausen himself simply mirrors some of the stretching gestures of
Althusser in his assessment of Lacan's contribution to critical science.
If Strathausen molds Lacan to an Althusserian mirror, Althusser molds
Lacan to the mirror of a curiously detached Symbolic with which
Althusser is preoccupied and which is central to his own analysis of the
interpellated subject.
In "Freud and Lacan," Althusser avows that "the most original
aspect of Lacan's work" is "that this transition from (ultimately purely)
biological existence to human existence (the human child) is achieved
within the Law of Order, the law I shall call the Law of Culture, and that
this Law of Order is confounded in its formal essence with the order of
language" (193). In this passage Althusser recognizes the crucial
function of language (though not its structural contribution) as well as
the absolute link among the subject, language, and the Law of Culture.
Althusser identifies the Law of Culture with the Symbolic Order which
he sees (finally) as "the emblem of the Father, the emblem of right, of
the Law, the fantasy image of all Right" (196-97). For Althusser, the
concept of the Symbolic as Law is necessary as the locus of ideologyas "the repressive apparatus" that reproduces the "conditions of
production" ("Ideology" 131). And he conflates this ideology identiPublished by New Prairie Press
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fled with the Symbolic with the unconscious precisely through the aegis
of the family reproductive scenario ("Ideology" 165).
The identification of the symbolic order with the Father and the
Father with Law and right again points to Althusser's paternal subtext,
the text with which he begins and ends. Althusser employs a version of
the family scenario as a way to illustrate how it is that "individuals are
always-already subjects" (73). Through the operation of family ideology and the predestiny of the "father's name," "the child is therefore
always-already subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific
familial configuration which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived" (165). Thus, through a paternity that equals the Symbolic, the
individual is the already-interpellated subject whose unconscious and
ideological frame are the same. This certainly makes a lot of paternity
as Althusser locates it as the prime signifier of the Symbolic.
Why is Althusser preoccupied with the Symbolic in his essay on
Freud and Lacan, especially when one of Lacan's most insistent
concepts is the co-existence of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real
orders? One clue lies in Althusser's link between the Symbolic and the
term "Right" connected to the father's right to the mother and by
extension to the order of legitimate offspring (197). Devoting the vast
majority of the portion of the essay on Lacan to a discussion of the
Symbolic as it relates to Right: to the Right of the father, to the Right of
culture, to the Right of psychoanalysis to claim itself a science,
Althusser's repetition reveals the fixation that structures his approach
to Lacan. By creating a new "family" of critical science and by
legitimizing therein its critical sons (such as Lacan) then his own project
is also legitimate, as another son of the new order. But while the process
of filiation would seem to extend from Lacan to Althusser in the logic
of the mirror employed by Strathausen to renew Marxist thought,
Althusser also situates himself as the father to a Lacan he is attempting
to salvage from the ignominy of illegitimacy.
Althusser had first encountered psychoanalysis in his own treatments for manic depression, but his interest in Lacan came as he
"situated Freud's discovery at the heart of the historic continent opened
up by Marx" in his attempt to revivify French communist thought
(Roudinesco 377). In 1963 he began to teach Lacan's works in his own
seminar at the Ecole Normale Supdrieure. Students read the works from
a more philosophical and less clinical perspective, according to Elizabeth Roudinesco, and began to understand Lacan's structuralist readings of Freud as scientific rather than as "bourgeois," the epithet
Marxists had previously extended to Freud. Lacan, who had been
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/8
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began his own fledgling school, the Ecole Freudienne de Paris in 1964,
the same year Althusser published "Freud and Lacan." By means of his
acknowledgement of the importance of Lacan's work, Althusser had
orchestrated a wider audience for a more "universalist" reading of
Freudian theory. As Roudinesco observes, "for the 'symbolic' launching of that mobilization which would occupy a far larger stage than the
ENS, Lacan owed everything to Althusser" (380).
Althusser also owed much to Lacan, whose analytical insights
enabled Althusser to renew French Marxist thought and make Althusser
famous within "a broad intellectual audience" (Roudinesco 381).
While in a sense the history of the early 1960s casts Althusser as a father
to Lacan, it is only as a son to Lacan that Althusser can forge new
theoretical directions. His insistence in "Freud and Lacan," then, on
Lacan's understanding of the role of the Symbolic and the right of the
father has everything to do in context with the scientific "right" of
psychoanalysis and its applicability to Marxist critique, the right of the
father Althusser to appropriate psychoanalytic thought for Marxism,
and ultimately the "right" of both Freud and Marx to father critical
movements that engender a different sense of history. Althusser's
recognition of Lacan retrospectively legitimates the bastards of the
nineteenth century, making them the new fathers of a dissidence that
becomes all too legitimate in its longevity in a kind of post-natal
institutionalization.
This process of legitimation via the paternal, however, owes its
"right" to the originary fathers' illegitimacy--their lack of paternity.
Their genius is proved by their rupture, by their inability to find language
or concepts in which they might express their own new visions of history,
the subject, and the order of human events. If their legitimacy-their
"right" to scientific prestige-comes from their lack of forbears, why
does Althusser reinscribe them within a family circle he has already
declared ideologically suspect? Is he simply another victim of ideology
unable to speak the scientific language he claims for the fathers as a
result of the very fact of his adopting them as his fathers (or sons)?
Althusser's insistent discussion of paternity and legitimacy at the
beginning of "Freud and Lacan" would seem to have everything to do
with his own legitimacy and the legitimacy of historical materialism in
a metaphor that defies the very notion of scientific discourse Althusser
insists upon. Premising the "right" of a discourse to the status of a
science on the model of the law-of-the-name-of-the-father and hailing
that science as a rupturing critique of the very law by which it is
legitimized exposes the contradiction at the heart of patriarchy: that the
law-of-the-name-of-the-father covers over the absence of certainty by
Published by New Prairie Press
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substituting the Symbolic for the scientific, by asserting a "right" where
one may not exist. For Althusser, the name of the father by which right
is authorized can never be the name of a father, but only the name of a
son who becomes the father to the fathers, who rescues them from the
illegitimacy their rupturing genius creates. Though the fathers of the
new sciences have no fathers, they have sons, who, in the name of the
father become self-fathering and self-authorizing, creating among
themselves a mutual fathering that in the names of their fathers
legitimates one another in a kind of critical cross-breeding. Curiously,
however, in all of the fathering and "son"-ing, Althusser casts Lacan
as neither father nor son, but rather as a midwife, the one who
"constrains" Freud's "liberating rupture" to "generate . its own
consequences. " Lacan's midwifery-his obstetrics-sideline him only
in locus parentis, while Althusser becomes the fathering son. Sibling
rivalry?
The foundling Freud, the orphaned Marx are mirrored by their
faithful bastard sons, the dissidents who walk in their fathers' dissidence, but who finally go one step farther by legitimating through one
another the very projects by which their own fathers became bastards.
This relegitimation, this re-inscription of the paternal line in the guise
of a dissident critique reveals not only the most insidious conservatism,
but also the way in which the sons create a new Symbolic in the place
of the "scientific" language critical science can speak. Even thinking
they might have exposed the folly of the name of the father, they return
to it most seriously, insisting on scientific critique which has become
covertly a truly paternal game enclosed in the trappings of issues of
legitimacy, orthodoxy, and right that have in fact enveloped the legacies
Althusser and Lacan. By making themselves fathers, fathers to their
fathers, and fathers to one another, they have tightened the circulation
of right to a father/son transaction, a reciprocal trade agreement by
which history, culture, law, and the Symbolic may be transferred. Who
better to understand the father than the son? And in a culture where the
bastard sons have all become fathers, only one thing is true: Father
knows best.
.
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